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wareness has been growing in recent years that modem societies, increasingly computer-dependent, are highly vulnerable to malicious intrusion into their computers and computer networks. Concern about this issue
is especially high in the United States; in all likelihood, no other country is more
at risk. The reality of these concerns is underscored by news reports chronicling
an active "cyberwar" that appears currendy to be underway. This is not, however, a conflict involving another State or even a terrorist group as the adversary.
Instead, this struggle pits federal law enforcement officials against computer
"hackers" who have defaced US Government Internet sites (including the website of the National Infrastructure Protection Center) and have threatened the
electronic destruction of Internet servers if the federal government continues
the batde. 1
At the moment, the reality of such computer network attack (CNA) by private individuals and non-State actors may be more pressing than the use ofCNA
as an instrument of hostile action by one State against another. Whether CNA
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actually has been used as an instrument ofState action is uncertain as of this writing. According to numerous press reports, President Clinton approved a covert
action against Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic that was intended to include
computer network attacks against Milosevic's financial assets held outside Yugoslavia. 2 It also has been reported that General Henry H. Shelton, Chairman of
the Joint ChiefS ofStaff, acknowledged that the United States used CNA against
Serbian computer networks in the course of the Kosova conflict and that the
Defense Department is actively engaged in organizing for the coordination not
only of defensive measures to protect military computer networks from
"cyberterrorists," but of offensive CNA operations.3 However, unnamed "senior defense officials" also have been quoted as saying that the United States refrained from implementing plans to use CNA against Serbian computer
networks for purposes of disrupting military operations and basic civilian services, due in part to legal guidance from the Defense Department's Office of
General Counsel that certain uses of CNA could be considered as "war
crimes."4
Thus, it remains unclear whether the United States attempted to use CNA in
connection with the Kosova conflict. There is no doubt, however, that the Department ofDefense has made an extensive study of the international legal issues
that such use could engenderS and that US military and national security e:ll.-perts,
looking to the possibility ofusing CNA in future conflicts, have an understandable
interest in understanding the implications of CNA under international law.
Such legal issues can arise under both the jus ad bellum and the jus iu bello. This
discussion is confined to the former, specifically to the extent to which peacetime use of CNA by or on behalf of a State (including use in the course of
hostilities that do not attain the status of a war under international law) can be
characterized as an exercise of "force" under Article 2(4) of the United Nations
Charter. 6 Because the discussion is limited to this threshold question, it will not
extend into other areas, in particular, when CNA that constitutes force under
Article 2(4) might also rise to the level of an "armed attack" under Article 51 of
the Charter or might be lawfully used as a defense against such an attack'?
At the outset, it may be useful to define the "rules ofengagement" for this discussion. Reisman has pointed out that jurists' formulations, which characteristically take the form of "this is the law," often refer "simultaneously and \vithout
discrimination to descriptions about flows of decisions in the past, predictions
about the way decisions may be taken in the future, or statements of preference."8 This criticism seems particularly applicable to statements about internationallaw. It thus is appropriate to make clear what kind ofstatements this chapter is intended to make.
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It is too early for any legal authority to have emerged on the status of CNA
under Article 2(4). Consequendy, analysis of the question must proceed on the
basis ofanalogy to such possibly relevant authority and doctrine as exists in other
contexts. The statements about the law set forth in this chapter, therefore, do not
purport to describe the flow ofpast decisions direcdy on point. Nor do they state
a policy preference unless explicidy identified as such. Rather, they are predictive ofwhere it appears that existing legal doctrine, found in other contexts, reasonably would carry a court seized with an issue concerning the status of
peacetime CNA under Article 2(4).
The conclusion to which such predictive analysis leads is that there is no
"bright-line" rule. Instead, certain applications ofCNA are likely to be held to
constitute force under Article 2(4), but many other applications are likely not to.
This nebulous conclusion may disappoint the proponents of two positions that
have emerged in scholarly and military circles. The first, focusing on the inherendy malicious and destructive nature of CNA, advocates that it should be considered to be a prohibited use of force under Article 2(4) and thus to violate
intemationallaw, except when otherwise authorized under the Charter. The
second, viewing CNA as having the beneficial potential to achieve military or
political objectives ,vith less violence than traditional means ofwarfare, points in
the opposite direction-CNA (except maybe in its most extreme applications)
should not be viewed as a prohibited use of force, because to do so would promote the application of more lethal techniques. Approaching the question in a
predictive mode, however, leads one to conclude that both these extremes are
examples of,vishful thinking, conflating a policy objective with a fair reading of
the state of the law. 9

Preliminary Questions
Before addressing the core question, several preliminary issues merit discussion, namely the definition of CNA, the techniques that it encompasses, and, finally, whether there is any real prospect that the status of CNA under Article
2(4) will be clarified without creating a new legal regime or clarifying instrument for that purpose.

The Definition of "Computer Network Attack"
A threshold question is what is meant by "computer network attack." CNA
has been defined inJoint ChiefS ofStaff doctrine as "operations to disrupt, deny,
degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks,
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or the computers and networks themselves. "10 For the sake of convenience, this
definition will be adopted for present purposes. But it should be noted that it
sweeps too broadly to be truly useful, because it includes a range of physical
techniques of attack that could be directed at almost any target.
Unless it be contended that computer facilities have a different status in international law than other facilities (a proposition for which there is no authority),
targeting a kinetic weapon, such as a missile, bomb or other explosive device, at
a computer (or, more likely, a structure known to house computing facilities)
should not raise any different question under intemationallaw than if the same
weapon were targeted at another piece ofequipment or a structure used for a different purpose. The operation itself almost certainly will be characterized as a use of
force. 11 Thus, because it includes techniques ofphysical attack that are not unique to
computers but instead are widely applicable without distinction as to target, the
Joint ChiefS' definition of CNA has limited utility as a tool oflegal analysis.
At the same time, the definition contains an ambiguity that also may limit its
usefulness, in that it is unclear whether it encompasses the manipulation of a
computer network to achieve an effect extrinsic to the network itself, as opposed
to merely rendering the network ineffective. An example ofsuch an extrinsic effect would be the hostile manipulation ofa computerized railway control system
as to produce train wrecks. 12 Similar hypothetical examples abound, running
from the potentially catastrophic13 to the merely vexatious. 14 While such operations could be viewed as a form of "degrading" the information resident in the
computer, the definitional fit is awkward. Since these manipulative variants of
CNA are, however, potentially among the most important from a force perspective, they will be assumed to be included within the definition for purposes of
this discussion. 1s
Techniques of CNA
How CNA is accomplished can have a bearing on the legal analysis. CNA is
not a monolithic technique. On the contrary, there are many methods by which
computer networks have been, or could be, attacked. Nor is CNA capable only
of being directed at a single objective. Instead, a broad array of purposes can be
served by hostile intrusion into computers or computer networks. These include, among others: (i) extracting the information held in the target computer
(espionage); (ii) disseminating information through the adversary's information
network in order to deceive the adversary or stimulate political instability; (iii)
preparing the batdespace by incapacitating the adversary's command, control,
and communication capabilities; or (iv) causing property damage, physical
76

Daniel B. Silver
injury, or death by manipulating infrastructure or operational systems controlled
by the target computer.
It should be obvious that which technique is being considered, as well as the
purposes for which it is to be employed, can make a significant difference to the
legal outcome. As noted above, a traditional physical attack (e.g., bombing the
building that houses the computers) seems to present no legal issues specific to
the fact that the target is a computer or computer network. The legally most interesting applications of CNA are those methods ofattack which are highly specific to computers because they make use of the methods by which computers
themselves operate.
Concern about infrastructure security and the potential vulnerability of the
United States to malicious intrusion on computers and computer networks has
generated considerable discussion of the non-kinetic technical means by which
computers might be attacked. 16 It is not necessary here to rehearse the technical
details. It is sufficient to note their general outlines. What is unique to computers
is their vulnerability to what has been called" digital data warfare" 17 namely the
covert introduction of malicious computer code into a computer system or network to achieve an objective.
There is a rich lexicon describing variants of malicious computer code (e.g.,
"virus," "'worm," "Trojan horse," "flying Dutchman," "time bomb," "logic
bomb"18), but the labels do not matter here. What is significant in the present
context is that malicious computer code can be designed to lie dormant until
triggered and to self-destruct and eliminate evidence of its presence after the
mission has been accomplished. Also significant is that most computer systems
are linked electronically to other systems and that malicious code usually can be
introduced into a computer system by electronic data transfer (over the Internet
or directly) as long as the attacker can evade or overwhelm whatever defenses are
built into the system. Malicious code also can be introduced into a computer
system by concealing it in hardware or software that the operator of the target
system unwittingly incorporates into the system. There also reportedly are
back-door techniques for introducing malicious code into computer systems
\vithout any use of media for which the system was designed, for example by
manipulating the power system or using high-energy radio frequencies or carefully controlled electromagnetic pulses.t 9

The Prospects that the Law will be Clarified
Although the application of UN Charter Article 2(4) to CNAis anintellectually interesting question, there is reason to wonder whether, as a practical matter,
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the issue ever will arise in a context requiring an actual decision. The most important obstacle may be the difficulty ofattributing CNA to State action. Moreover, even if State use ofCNA were to emerge as a recognizable phenomenon,
such CNA would have to occur in relative isolation in order squarely to pose the
relevant legal issue. Because this seems improbable, it likely will be a long time, if
ever, before the practice of States, decisions of the International Court ofJustice
(IC]), or other recognized sources of international law yield a clarification of
how Article 2(4) applies to CNA. Thus, the best prospect for a prompt and authoritative elucidation of the status ofCNA under Article 2(4) would be ifStates
were to agree to define the legal parameters ofCNA through an appropriate international instrument.
1. State action. Although various authors have posited a number of forms
that an incident ofCNA could take, from disrupting air traffic control systems to
"busting" dams or oil pipelines, the rub is that, at least up to the time of this writing and to the best of the author's knowledge, none ofthese imaginable instances
of CNA actually has been perpetrated by a State or with publicly-discernible
State sponsorship.2o Indeed, the more extreme (and therefore more interesting)
examples apparendy have not occurred at all.
It certainly is true that numerous instances of intrusion into computer networks by private individuals (generally called "hacking") have taken place recendy.21 Some of these have been fairly primitive, such as the flooding of US
Government Internet websites with messages ("spamming") emanating from
Serbia and protesting US bombing ofthat country.22 Others have been more sophisticated and potentially quite hannful, including attacks on Defense Department and other US Government computer networks. But most appear to have
been the work of individuals or groups not identified (at least not in any source
accessible to the public) as sponsored by a State.
Lacking acknowledged, or at least provable, State action or State sponsorship,
such events must be considered as raising problems in international criminality,
not public international law. Moreover, to date there appears to have been no
State reaction to CNA in the international legal arena. Because no State has yet
taken any action or asserted a legal position vis-a.-vis another State arising out of
an incident of CNA, there is a lack of the State practice that could illuminate the
international legal analysis of CNA, whether under Article 2(4) or under customary international law.
This state of affairs is not surprising. CNA is a new phenomenon. Moreover,
unlike many other putative techniques offorce, most forms ofCNA may be difficult or impossible to trace to the real perpetrator. Indeed, the most effective
forms of CNA are likely to be contrived so as to conceal the fact that they
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occurred at all, leaving the target State in doubt as to whether the affected computer network was externally attacked or simply failed for other reasons. Obviously, to the extent that it is not possible plausibly to demonstrate the existence
of an event of CNA, even less the identity of the perpetrator and a nexus to a
State sufficient to imply State responsibility, any State response based on an alleged violation of Article 2(4), or indeed any other norm of international law,
would lack credibility.
This issue is exacerbated by the amorphous structure of the Internet. If an incident of CNA is effected by "indirect penetration"23 over the Internet, it may
be difficult to determine where it originated. There is no inherent reason why
the point from which the attack is launched must be in the territory of the State
that caused the act to be done. Moreover, even if the identity of the immediate
perpetrator is discovered, it may be impossible to demonstrate a link between
that person or organization and a State to which responsibility for the CNA can
be attributed. To date, the mode of CNA in actual practice is the computer
"hacker," wreaking havoc for sport or, occasionally, for some ideological motive. One would expect any State that chose to use CNA as a weapon to attempt
to make its efforts look like those of a hacker.
Moreover, the contexts in which a State is most likely to use CNA unaccompanied by an array of traditional military instruments are intelligence collection
and covert action, for example, the use ofCNA to sow unrest in the target State's
population. Such applications of CNA, however, probably are also the least
likely to be publicly acknowledged by, or credibly attributable to, the State that
perpetrates them.
2. Unlikelihood ofIsolated Use. In order for the status ofCNA under Article 2(4) to emerge as an issue, the incident in question probably would have to
be considered in isolation. If, as may have been the case in the Kosova conflict,
CNA is used in the context of a military operation conducted by traditional
means that indubitably constitute force, the target State would have litde interest
in raising a legal dispute on the sole issue of CNA. (Thus, Serbia may have tenable claims that the entire operation conducted against it was a violation ofinternational law, but it is unlikely that it would single out US hacking into its
computer networks, ifit occurred, as a separate violation, even less one worthy
of an individualized response.)

The Status of CNA Under Article 2(4)
Lacking any direcdy applicable precedents or other sources of international
law, the status of CNA under Article 2(4) only can be predicted by drawing
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analogies to other phenomena whose status is better established. If CNA in all its
manifestations easily could be assimilated to armed force, further discussion
would be superfluous, since Article 2(4) indisputably encompasses armed force.
Neither every form of CNA nor every purpose for which CNA can be used,
however, readily can be analogized to armed force. Some applications ofCNA
(including, notably, those the United States is reported to have contemplated
using against Slobodan Milosevic) operate only in the economic or political
sphere, thus making highly relevant the question whether Article 2(4) encompasses measures of economic or political coercion, or, ifnot all such measures, at
least those that threaten the target State's territorial integrity or political independence. Moreover, because it may be unclear (given the inherent problems of
tracing CNA to its source) whether an incident ofCNA has been conducted by
military forces, another relevant issue, if one is to reason by analogy, is whether
non-military uses of physical force can fall within the scope of Article 2(4).

Economic and Political Coercion as Force
Virtually since the Charter was adopted, controversy has existed as to
whether measures ofeconomic and political coercion constitute force under Article 2(4). The weight ofscholarly opinion supports the negative view,24 but that
does not appear to have put the question to rest, at least as applied to CNA. Thus,
one recent analysis ofCNA under Article 2(4), while admitting that the "prevailing view" among scholars would confine Article 2(4) to "armed force," asserts that a more balanced, contextual view of Article 2(4) would conclude that
economic and political sanctions can threaten international peace and a target
State's territorial integrity and political independence and therefore can fall
within the ambit ofArticle 2(4); the author's conclusion that CNA generally falls
within Article 2(4) derives from this premise. 25 In contrast, another recent analysis of the status ofCNA under Article 2(4) adopts the opposite conclusion, that
"the prohibition of the threat or use of force includes armed, but not economic
or political coercion. "26 The same author goes on to comment, however, that
the borders offorce do not necessarily "precisely coincide with armed force, i.e.,
physical or kinetic force applied by conventional weaponry."27
On balance, the latter perspective is better founded. Although a conclusion that
economic or political coercion standing alone constitutes force under Article 2(4)
might well contribute more to the purposes ofthe Charter and to the maintenance
ofworld order than the contrary, that does not make it tenable as a matter oflegal
analysis. A number of points sustain the view that Article 2(4) does not apply to
measures of political or economic coercion. These include the following:
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• The historical background of Article 2(4) shows that it was conceived
against a background of international efforts to eliminate unilateral
recourse to armed force. 28 Measures of economic and political coercion
were not the issue.
• The travaux preparatoires of the Charter indicate that the San Francisco
Conference declined to adopt a proposal that was advanced to extend the
prohibition on the use offorce to include economic sanctions. Subsequent
General Assembly declarations, principally the Declaration on Friendly
Relations29 and the Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness
of the Principle of Refraining from Threat or Use of Force in
International Relations,3o provided an opportunity for the General
Assembly to clarify the issue by delineating economic and political
coercion as equivalents of armed force for purposes of Article 2(4). Efforts
were made by some Members to this end, but they met resistance from
other Members and were unsuccessful, 31 demonstrating that there is no
common understanding among Members that would support extending
Article 2(4) to economic or political coercion.
• There is no decision of the International Court ofJustice (IC]) holding
that measures of economic or political coercion constitute force under
Article 2(4). Indeed in the Nicaragua case,32 in which the Court generally
considered the customary international law prohibition against the use of
force to be coterminous with Article 2(4) (which was not itself at issue),
Nicaragua complained of substantial measures of economic pressure.
These were considered to be violations of the bilateral treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between Nicaragua and the
United States, however, and were not even mentioned as possible
violations of the customary international law prohibition on the use of
force. Moreover, the Court held that even the United States' furnishing of
substantial financial support to insurgent forces in Nicaragua, support that
was used to sustain acts of violence, did not constitute the use of force
under customary international law. 33 It would seem, if financing an
armed insurrection is not force, that, afortiori, other economic measures
that have a less direct nexus to armed violence would not be either.
Thus, despite arguments advanced to the contrary, the fact remains that the
drafting history of the Charter is inconsistent with such an extension, that this
question generally has divided Western States from significant components of
the "Third W orId," and that no international consensus has emerged defining
economic and political coercion, standing alone, as force, although there is a
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strong basis for concluding that such forms of coercion may violate other norms
ofinternationallaw, such as the principle of non-intervention.34
An argument can be made that the prevailing view regarding economic and
political measures of coercion should not apply to CNA. Although ultimately
not convincing, it proceeds along the following lines. In more than half a century of debate over the application ofArticle 2(4) to economic and political coercion, the kind of coercion that has been envisaged has been primarily external
and gradual-trade sanctions, withholding economic benefits, unequal trading
practices, interference with the target State's external commercial relations. In
contrast, the kind of economic coercion that CNA might make possible, crippling the banking system, or shutting down the securities markets, operates on
the internal economic structures of the target State and does so through a swift
and devastating blow. Therefore, since CNA is a different phenomenon, it can
be argued that the earlier debate over economic and political sanctions as force is
irrelevant.
While the factual premise underlying this argument may be valid, all it demonstrates is the neutral fact that CNA is a new form of hostile activity. That
CNA may differ from earlier forms of economic and political coercion does
not tell us whether CNA comes within the intended scope of Article 2(4) or
instead should be viewed as another manifestation of the types of economic
and political coercion that various states have failed to persuade the international community to acknowledge as falling within the definition of "force. "
In analyzing the application of Article 2(4) to CNA in order to predict how
the ICJ and the world community will view CNA, it seems prudent, in light of
existing legal authority, to acknowledge, however much a different conclusion
might be desired on policy grounds, that there is little likelihood that purely economic or political coercion, even ifeffectuated in novel ways, will be considered
to violate Article 2(4). If this proposition is correct, it suggests that the touchstone in any future analysis ofCNA under Article 2(4) will be whether the specific application ofCNA at issue more closely resembles economic and political
coercion, on the one hand, or, on the other hand, military force as the latter concept is commonly understood.
Non~Military

Physical Force

Another interpretive issue under Article 2(4) that bears on the status ofCNA
is whether non-military physical measures can also constitute force for purposes
of Article 2(4). Examples of such measures would include: a State intentionally
acts to cause flooding in an adjacent down river State; a State sets a forest fire in a
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frontier region intending that it spread into the target State; a State releases noxious substances into the environment, knowing that the effect will be felt in the
target State. Opinion is divided as to the status ofsuch acts under Article 2(4) and
there is no decisional authority direcdy on point. Some scholars admit the possibility that in certain circumstances a hostile use of such non-military forms of
physical force could fall within Article 2(4), especially ifthe results rose to a level
of magnitude that could be viewed as the equivalent of an armed attack triggering the right of self-defense under Article 51.35
The better view would appear to be that non-military physical force can indeed fall \vithin Article 2(4), even if the consequences do not rise to the level of
an armed attack. The principal reason why scholars have opposed such an extension ofArticle 2(4) appears to be a "slippery slope" fear that applying Article 2(4)
to non-military physical force when its effects approximate those of military
force would open the door to applying Article 2(4) to measures ofeconomic and
political coercion that have similarly devastating effects. This fear is misplaced.
In the case of non-military physical force, the fact that the force is physical is
enough, first, to distinguish it from coercive economic and political measures
and, second, to support an analogy to those military forms of physical force that
clearly lie at the core of Article 2(4).
If one is prepared to admit that non-military physical measures can constitute
force for purposes ofArticle 2(4), it is hard to see why this should be the case only
if the consequences are ofa type and degree ofseriousness that would rise to the
level of an armed attack. It is widely recognized that not all force under Article
2(4) necessarily constitutes an armed attack under Article 51. The ICJ implicidy
so stated when it indicated in the Nicaragua case that supplying arms and other
support to armed rebel bands in another State is not an armed attack but could
constitute a violation of the customary international prohibition on the use of
force. 36 To require non-military force to rise to the level of an armed attack in
order to violate Article 2(4) would obliterate the important distinction between
Articles 2(4) and 51. Such a position would either legalize under Article 2(4) a
broad range of hostile and destructive physical acts that fail to reach the armed
attack threshold or would provide an incentive to lower the Article 51 threshold, with a concurrent risk ofexpanding violence under the pretext oflegitimate
self-defense. Thus, on balance, it seems better to conclude (although admittedly without the benefit of any supporting authority) that intentional, hostile
uses of non-military physical force by one State against another can fall within
the scope of Article 2(4) when they sufficiendy resemble military force in their
physically destructive effect, whether or not the criteria of an armed attack
are met.
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Flexibility of the Concept of Military Force
Even if one were to accept the restrictive view that force under Article 2(4)
means military force, it should be noted that the latter concept carries a large
measure of:flexibility. As the techniques ofwarfare evolve, so too does the general understanding of what constitutes "military" force. If this were not so, the
prohibition of Article 2(4) would become ossified at the level of military technology that existed at the end ofWorld War II and would become increasingly
irrelevant to the modem world. Thus, we have no difficulty in recognizing that
new forms of biological and chemical warfare, directed energy, lasers, and other
innovative technologies, if used intentionally by a State to cause physical injury
or property damage in another State, will constitute forms of military or armed
force. This applies even when the instrument itself, like a laser beam, is not inherently harmful but also is used for a range of beneficent purposes.
'the hard question is how one recognizes when a new technology has become a form of military or armed force. The answer is not always obvious, but
one significant criterion is whether the technique is associated \vith the armed
forces of the State that uses it. Thus, in the case ofCNA, ifthis technique were to
be deployed only by intelligence agencies in conducting covert actions, it seems
less likely that it would be generally accepted as a form ofmilitary or armed force
than ifit were used by the armed forces. Consequently, it is likely that the fact
that the US Department of Defense (apparently joined by the military forces of
other countries) is making preparations for the military use ofCNA will hasten
the day when a State's offensive use of CNA, at least for purposes of causing
physical injury or property damage, will be considered a use offorce under Article 2(4).

Preliminary Conclusions
Against the background of the foregoing discussion, what preliminary conclusions can be reached about the application ofArticle 2(4) to CNA? The basic
conclusion appears to be that force is like pornography: the law will recognize
certain forms of CNA as force when it sees them. The present state oflega! development does not permit laying down any hard and fast rules as to when that
will be. It does, however, permit one to make some predictions about the circumstances in which State use of CNA may be likely to be held to constitute
force under Article 2(4).
• CNA is not a single form of activity, nor is it potentially capable only of
being directed at a single purpose. Thus there is no basis for concluding
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that all fonns of CNA per se constitute a violation of Article 2(4).
Consequendy, whether and when CNA will fall within the force category
must be determined on a case-by-case basis. The question is how.
• CNA is most like traditional military force, and thus most likely to
constitute force under Article 2(4), ifits direct and foreseeable effects are
physical injury or property damage.
• CNA that direcdy and foreseeably produces physical injury or property
damage similar to that resulting from the use of traditional forms of
weaponry is likely to be viewed as a use of force under Article 2(4),
especially if that CNA is carried out by a State's armed forces.
• CNA that produces effects (even if direct and foreseeable) that are only of
an economic or political nature is not likely to be held to be within the
scope of Article 2(4). (Thus a program ofCNA that crippled the financial
infrastructure of a target State would not be a use of force under Article
2(4). Even if angry investors rioted and tore down the stock exchange,
that physical damage would not be direct and foreseeable.)
The notion that CNA will be recognized as force under Article 2(4) when it
sufficiendy resembles military force implies that views on particular fonns of
CNA are likely to evolve in light of developments in military operations. These
may lead to surprising conclusions. For example, before NATO's campaign
against Serbia, one might have predicted that using CNA to produce transitory
power outages in a target State would not be recognizable as an analog or equivalent of military force, because it causes no permanent damage to the targeted
power system, and the effects on users of power, including the military, are uncertain, indirect and incalculable. Transitory outages seem more ofan economic
measure or a psychological weapon (intended, if one may put it this way, to induce a sense of powerlessness in the target State's population and leadership)
than a military one.
In the last year, however, it was reported that the United States, on behalf of
NATO, employed an innovative form ofweapon against Serbia, a type ofcarbon
filaments used against electric power facilities. 37 The filaments were dropped from
aircraft, like a bomb, with the intention of causing property damage. Thus, it
seems incontrovertible that their use was a form of armed force, even though the
attacks did litde or no permanent damage, merely shorting out the power system
and disabling it for a briefperiod, thereby producing some disruption to the economy and the military effort, but having principally a psychological effect.
The same kinds of effects on the power system could be produced by CNA.
Should this ever occur, it is likely that the earlier military use of the analogous
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weapon described above will color the way the world looks at such use of CNA to
shut down a target State's power system through manipulating its computerized
controls. The existence ofa military, non-CNA precedent, it is submitted, will create a predisposition to try to fit such an incident ofCNA into the force category.

The Views of Other Commentators
A small number of commentators have addressed the status of CNA under
Article 2(4) and have come to widely divergent conclusions. A few assert that
CNA causing destructive effects is ipso facto a use of "force. " Others espouse the
view advanced in this chapter, that CNA will only constitute force under Article
2(4) if it sufficiently resembles what the world recognizes as armed or military
force and focus on attempting to provide a more precise way of identifying the
principles that underlie such recognition.
1. Destructive effect as the touchstone. In one of the most extensive examinations of this issue to date, Sharp has proposed a rule that appears both
sweeping and simple: "Any computer network attack that intentionally causes
any destructive effect within the sovereign territory ofanother state is an unlawful use offorce within the meaning ofArticle 2(4) that may produce the effects of
an armed attack prompting the right of self-defense. "38
It should be noted that this rule is not without its own interpretive issues.
Does the term "destructive" mean only physical destruction, for example, or
does it include economic harm? Sharp suggests that it could include the latter in
some circumstances. He concludes that Article 2(4), while not including all coercive economic and political sanctions that are intended to influence another
State's policy or actions, does extend to coercive political and economic sanctions that threaten the territorial integrity or independence of another State. 39
Thus, a non-physical destructive effect (such as disruption of financial markets)
should be considered force under Article 2(4) if it is sufficiently serious to
threaten the target State's territorial integrity or independence.
Aside from the fact that this conclusion is inconsistent with the weight oflegal
authority, extending the concept of" destruction" to include coercive economic
and political measures, but only if they threaten another State's territorial integrity or independence, seems likely to deprive the posited rule of much ofits apparent objectivity and simplicity, because it is not easy to determine when
economic and political measures are likely to have such an effect unless the judgment is being made after the effect already has been produced.
For example, the Arab boycott ofIsrael manifestly was intended to threaten
that country's territorial integrity and independence; it was carried out by States
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that had declared war on Israel and espoused as their war aim the total elimination of the target country. Did that set of economic measures, or the associated
political measures intended to delegitimize Israel in the international arena, really "threaten" Israel's territorial integrity and independence? With the benefit
ofhindsight, the answer clearly seems negative, but at different points in time the
outcome was not so clear. Would we therefore conclude that the Arab boycott
was a violation ofArticle 2(4) at certain periods in Israel's history and not at others? Such a result seems an unworkable rule oflaw. The example illustrates the
difficulty, except perhaps in the most extreme cases, of applying a rule that depends on determining when a threat exists to territorial integrity or political
independence.
In advancing the "destructive effect" standard, Sharp reasons on the basis
of the proposition that other forms of non-military physical force constitute
force under Article 2(4),40 citing as examples the release of floodwaters or the
spreading offire across a border. 41 The argument then proceeds to adumbrate
types of significant property damage, as well as possible human fatalities, that
could be effected through CNA, such as flooding, train wrecks, plane crashes,
chemical e}..l'losions, and fires. If these physically destructive events would constitute force under Article 2(4) ifproduced by a State agency using non-military
means, it is argued, why should they not also be considered force when produced by CNA?
Although the underlying premise does not seem to be supported by judicial
decision or State practice, the conclusion nonetheless is reasonable and should
be widely accepted if confined to the examples given above. The analysis becomes markedly less compelling, however, when this already untested proposition is used as a springboard to make a leap into the arena of the financial,
political, or psychological. The analogy to flood or fire is not convincing as a basis
for concluding that causing "a run on banks or a massive financial crisis by crashing national stock exchanges"42 also would constitute force. It pushes the underlying principle too far. (It should be noted that this assessment is not intended as a
value judgment. Such State intervention in the affairs of another ought to be
prohibited by international law and, indeed, may well may be on other grounds,
such as the principle of non-intervention. The sole question, here, is whether
Article 2(4) provides the norm.)
There might well be narrow circumstances in which Article 2(4) could be
held applicable to an attack having effects solely or primarily in the economic or
political sphere, but, ifso, it is submitted, this would be because ofthe means employed, not the nature of the target. For example, if a State were to use physical
but non-military means to achieve these results (e.g., dispatching intelligence
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operatives into the target State to cut a fiber-optic cable on which essential financial information is transmitted), scholars might well conclude that an incident of force had occurred. Suppose instead, however, that a State sought to
achieve the same end, financial disruption in the target State, through purely
non-physical means, such as large-scale falsification of trading orders or dissemination offalse market information. These seem to be quintessential measures of
economic coercion, and it is very unlikely that scholarly opinion would sustain
the view that such acts constituted force under Article 2(4). Thus, identity of
ultimate effects, standing alone, simply does not supply a sufficient basis for concluding that Article 2(4) applies. The reason why the act of sabotage might be
held to constitute force is not the end result (that the stock exchange crashes),
but cutting the cable would involve an intrusion on the target State's territory
that, although arguably "non-military," would achieve a physical effect closely
resembling the use of kinetic action.
2. Characteristics ofanned force as the touchstone. In a recent analysis,
Schmitt, recognizing that within the existing framework of international law,
CNA will be deemed to be Article 2(4) force only when it sufficiently resembles
armed force, embarks on an impressive effort to delineate a principled basis for
identifying those cases of CNA that meet this test.
He notes that traditional notions of force are instrument-based: the Article
2(4) prohibition against using a particular instrument, namely military force,
against another State is tied to the high degree ofcongruence between its use and
reprobated consequences, primarily physical destruction and injury. This, it is
posited, explains why armed force, which almost always results in physical destruction or injury, is prohibited force, while economic or political coercion,
whose tie to predictable physical destruction or injury is tenuous, is not. 43
This observation is not entirely satisfying, however, because, as Schmitt has
recognized, "the instruments do not precisely track the threats to shared values
which, ideally, the international community would seek to deter."44 It is clear
that many technologies that would be recognized as weapons when used for the
purpose of causing physical damage or personal injury, e.g., laser beams, can be
entirely beneficent in other uses, such as medicine. Thus, when we assign one of
those technologies to the "armed force" category, it is not because ofits inherent
lethality but because ofthe potential destructiveness ofthe way it is being used or
the purpose for which it is deployed. The same could be said of CNA. And, for
this reason, it seems unlikely that many would debate that CNA used directly to
cause physical destruction or injury (busting a dam, rupturing a pipeline, causing
airplanes or trains to crash) is tantamount to~ a weapon for purposes of Article
2(4), making its use force. The question is whether, applying criteria that will be
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recognized as consistent with the current understanding of Article 2(4), any
other use of CNA is sufficiendy similar to these easy cases to be placed confidendy in the force category.
To answer this question, Schmitt has suggested that, unless the international community is prepared to adopt a new normative structure to apply to
inter-State coercion, the analysis of CNA must be fit into the traditional
instrument/ consequence based frame of reference by looking to see whether
particular uses of CNA meet the criteria that distinguish armed force from political or economic coercion. 45 These criteria, he suggests, are: severity-the
higher threat ofphysical injury or property damage associated with armed force;
immediacy-the comparative swiftness ofharm arising from armed force, as compared with other forms of coercion; directness-the relatively direct connection
between armed force and negative consequences, as compared with other forms
of coercion; invasiveness-the fact that in the case of armed force the act causing
harm generally crosses into the territory of the target State whereas measures of
economic or political coercion normally do not; measurability-the greater
ease and certainty ofassessing the consequences ofarmed force as compared with
other forms of coercion; and presumptive legitimacy-the fact that violence is
presumptively illegal under domestic and international law, whereas most (or
at least many) techniques of economic and political coercion are presumptively legal.46
It would be desirable to be able to delineate criteria for identifying those types
of CNA that should be treated as analogous to armed force. Yet, it is not clear
that Schmitt's proposed six criteria reliably serve this purpose. Rather, examination of the criteria suggests that virtually any event ofCNA can be argued to fall
on the armed force side of the line, except perhaps as regards the criterion ofseverity, and that the criterion ofseverity in effect is just another way of articulating the observation that, for an event of CNA to be considered a type of force
under Article 2(4), it must produce (or atleast threaten to produce) personal injury or property damage similar to that caused by military weapons. Review of
the proposed criteria, it is submitted, substantiates this proposition.
Immediacy: CNA ordinarily occurs with great immediacy, once its destructive
potential is triggered. While malicious software may be designed to lie dormant
for an extended period until some triggering event occurs, once it becomes active, the disruption of the targeted computer or computer network can be expected to be immediate, as well as immediately perceptible in result, even if the
owner of the computer does not recognize that CNA is the cause ofits degradation or destruction. (It is hard to imagine circumstances in which a slow, imperceptible deterioration of the targeted computer would be advantageous to the
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author of the attack.) Thus, there seems to be little difference between CNA and
ordinary anned force,
Directness: Compared to economic or political coercion, many applications of
CNA are as direct as traditional armed force. The consequences generally flow
directly from the act of attack itself and do not depend on intervening or contributory factors in order to have harmful effect. Directness might become an
issue if the only harmful effect were property damage and any effect on human
beings was reactive. Thus, there could be a significant difference between CNA
that caused a dam's floodgates to open and kill people, and CNA that merely inconvenienced the target population (e.g., by disrupting financial markets) to
such a degree that rioting ensued. On the other hand, the path even from the latter form ofCNA to the reprobated result ofphysical injury and tangible property
damage is no more (or less) indirect than similar consequences, such as starvation
or health disasters, arising from a military blockade. Yet a military blockade is
undeniably a use offorce. To the extent that the directness criterion is useful, it
really seems to do no more than restate the proposition that to constitute force an
event of CNA must directly cause physical injury or property damage and not
operate solely in the economic or political realm.
Invasiveness: At least at the level of electrons, the act causing the harm in a
CNA attack usually crosses into the target State, whether it be by importation of
a corrupted item of hardware or software, the actions of an agent of the hostile
State (a cyber saboteur), or cross-border data transmission over the telephone
network. There appears to be no difference, in this regard, between CNA and
traditional armed force.
Measurability: There seems no reason to assume that the consequences of an
event of CNA would be any harder to measure than the negative consequences
of armed coercion.
Presumptive legitimacy: Many States already have enacted laws outlawing CNA
when perpetrated by private parties within the territory. As more and more
States become aware of the threat, it is likely that this technique, at least when
used by non-State actors, will be viewed in most States as presumptively illegal,47 thus eliminating any distinction between CNA and what traditionally has
been regarded as armed force.
Factoring out those of the criteria that do not appear reliably to distinguish
CNA from armed coercion, all that is left is severity. Moreover, severity, as defined for this purpose, seems applicable only to physical injury and property
damage, compelling the conclusion that CNA will be considered within the
force category only if its foreseeable consequence is to cause physical injury or
property damage and, even then, only if the severity of those foreseeable

a

90

Daniel B. Silver
consequences resembles the consequences that are associated with armed coercion. In short, what seems at first blush to be a nuanced way of analyzing incidents of CNA in practice may in fact tum out to do no more than identify the
cases that would be clear without applying a criterion any more formal than was
suggested in the preliminary conclusions above: CNA will be considered as
force when it causes physical i~ury or property damage that is recognizably similar to that produced by instruments generally identified as weapons.
The limitations of the proposed factors are demonstrated by Schmitt's own
comparison of two hypothetical uses of CNA. 48 In the first, CNA is used to disable an air traffic control system, causing airplanes to crash. According to
Schmitt, this meets the criteria and is force. In the second example, the attacker
destroys a university computer network for purposes of disrupting military research being conducted on campus. This does not meet the test and is not force.
Schmitt suggests that there should be a different result in the attack on the university because the desired outcome, diminished capacity on the batdefield, is
too remote from the event ofCNA and too dependent on indeterminate factors.
But this is not persuasive; the question of remoteness depends on how the outcome is defined. The immediate objective of the hypothetical CNA is to degrade the functioning ofthe targeted computer network, and the nexus between
the act and that outcome is immediate. (One could as well argue that dropping
filaments on Serbian electric power facilities to produce temporary power outages is remote from the ultimate objective, impairing Serbia's ability to maintain
military operations. Yet few would gainsay that the NATO bombing raids in
which these devices were dropped constituted force under Article 2(4).) Thus,
except for this purported difference in directness, Schmitt's two examples are remarkably similar ,vith respect to the proposed factors. In reality, it is submitted,
the only tenable reason, and the real underlying explanation, for the difference
in the posited outcome is that in the first case there is physical i~ury and significant property damage and in the second there is not.
That severity does not reliably predict the legal outcome unless it is confined
to the severity of physical injury and/or property damage is shown by considering another hypothetical use of CNA, disruption of the target State's financial
system through interference with the computers through which securities are
traded, money moves, and financial transactions are recorded and setded. Ifsuccessfully used against the United States or many other Western countries, the resulting social and economic disruption and monetary losses would be staggering.
For each of Schmitt's factors, this event ofCNA seems comparable to disabling
an air traffic control system, except for the fact that it does not direcdy and
foreseeably result in physical injury or property damage. In terms of severity,
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more broadly construed, can there be any doubt that the impact ofsuch an attack
would be orders ofmagnitude more serious than ifa hostile State, through a missile attack that caused no loss oflife, obliterated a military warehouse full of uniforms--an incident that no one would hesitate to describe as within the scope of
Article 2(4)? Yet, applying the existing legal framework for analyzing Article 2(4),
this hypothetical attack on the country's financial infrastructure probably would
be considered to fall outside the Article 2(4) force category, because it much more
closely resembles economic coercion than traditional armed force.

Conclusion: The Unsatisfactory Reality
There is no legal authority directly applicable to the status of CNA under Article 2(4). The most significant interpretive issue under Article 2(4) that might
support extending it to a broad range of types ofCNA is whether force includes
economic or political coercion, and the weight of prevailing opinion is that it
does not. Against this background, two approaches recently have been suggested
in the literature. The first, destructiveness as the criterion, is relatively simple to
apply (or could be made so with a few clarifications) and might be an appealing
rule in a legislative context. The problem is that it is not founded in sufficient legal authority to engender confidence as a correct predictive statement of international law under Article 2(4). The second recognizes the limitations imposed
by prevailing interpretations of Article 2(4) and tries to remain faithful to them,
while positing criteria by which one can recognize those uses ofCNA that fall in
the force category. The exercise turns out to be somewhat illusory, however. At
bottom, it leads to a conclusion that probably can be reached by reference to
only one criterion: whether the foreseeable consequence ofa particular manifestation ofCNA is physical injury or property damage comparable to that resulting
from military weapons. Ifso, the CNA will be held to fall within the force category. Otherwise it will not. 49
What we are left with, it is submitted, is a situation in which general agreement probably can be reached on the proposition that there are some kinds of
CNA that so resemble armed force that, like other manifestations of
non-military physical force that have been suggested as falling within Article
2(4) (e.g., diverting a river in the hostile State so as to cause flooding in the target
State), they will be held to fall within the scope of Article 2(4). It is likely that
these forms ofCNA will be recognized widely as Article 2(4) force if and when
they occur, but it is difficult to articulate the precise bases on which recognition
will rest. The one basis that seems most reliable is that physical injury or property
damage must arise as a direct and foreseeable consequence of the CNA and must
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resemble the injury or damage associated with what, at the time, are generally
recognized as military weapons.
This conclusion appears highly unsatisfactory, leaving the law in a state ofuncertainty, but does it really matter that much? First, it is clear that, whether or
not they violate Article 2(4), most significant uses ofCNA probably will violate
other rules of international law, such as the prohibition against intervention in
the affairs of other States, which the IC] has held to be a principle of customary
international law. 50 Various specific techniques used in carrying out CNA are
likely to violate other international treaties, such as those relating to telecommunications. Thus, responsible decision-makers concerned about determining the legality of proposed uses of CNA are not bereft oflegal principles to
guide them.
Second, at least from the target State's perspective, the key issue is whether an
incident of CNA gives rise to a right to take counteraction in self-defense. For
that right to arise under the Charter, there must be an armed attack within the
meaning of Article 51, a standard that goes beyond the existence offorce under
Article 2(4). It is difficult to say whether an event ofCNA that caused significant
physical injury and/or property damage, standing alone, ever could be considered an armed attack. In all likelihood, however, a State's use of CNA of such
magnitude would not occur in isolation; instead it probably would form part ofa
coordinated offensive, other elements of which undeniably would constitute
armed attack. In such a context, the legal status of the CNA element in isolation
probably would be of little importance.
Third, worrying about the status of CNA under Article 2(4) may be fiddling
while Rome burns. The notion that the Charter represents the sole legal structure under which coercive force can be exerted by one State against another
largely has been discredited-both by the failure of the Security Council mechanism to function as envisioned by the Charter's framers and by the practice of
States in ignoring recourse to the Security Council in favor of unilateral (including alliance-based) interventionism. The recent NATO humanitarian intervention in Serbia, which was given the fig leafofa Security Council resolution only
after its military aims were achieved, may be a step on the road to a better and
more moral system ofinternational law, butit was only the most recent in a series
of events that, over the decades, have dealt a heavy blow to the system supposedly established by the Charter. 51 These events sustain the view that, while Article 2(4) represents an aspiration, (perhaps, like another form of prohibition, a
failed "noble eJo..-periment"), the reality of international law on the use of force
lies in the development ofa "nuanced code for appraising the lawfulness ofindividual unilateral uses offorce"52 that is different from Article 2(4). Ifso, it can be
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eAl'ected that over time a set of understandings as to the lawfulness of CNA will
evolve outside the Charter framework.
This patient approach will not satisfY many, especially those who view CNA as a
dangerous phenomenon. Enormous benefits to humankind, both actual and potential, derive from the use of computers. Advanced societies are moving towards
pervasive dependence on the interplay of computer networks and advanced
communications technologies. While not all consequences necessarily are welcome Ooss of privacy, for example, is a significant concern), technologically
sophisticated countries like the United States are experiencing enormous benefits in terms of increased productivity and enhancement of many aspects of the
quality oflife. These are benefits to which the rest ofthe world appears to aspire.
Yet technological sophistication engenders a degree of vulnerability that
would have been unimaginable in earlier generations. (Who would have imagined a few decades ago that significant numbers ofpeople would fear the end ofa
millennium not for religious reasons but because ofa computer programming issue?) Human well-being throughout the world increasingly will depend on the
inviolability of computer networks and the communications links that connect
them. The world, it can be argued, should not have to rely for protection on unclear and debatable interpretations of the Charter or on principles of customary
international law, such as non-intervention, that are honored in the breach and
carry no ready enforcement mechanism. Nor should civilian populations be exposed to the risk that a code of rules on the use of CNA will evolve only after
devastating examples of its use have pointed the way.
Thus, it is suggested (and this is an explicit expression of a policy preference,
not a statement about the law as it is), efforts should be made towards the adoption of an international convention that would bind the parties not to use CNA
for any military or hostile use. This should be accompanied by enhanced efforts,
whether in the context of the same convention or separately, to achieve global
legal cooperation in fighting CNA perpetrated by non-State actors, by making
such action criminal under domestic laws regardless of purported justification,
and by allowing prosecution of the perpetrators wherever apprehended or their
extradition to the country in which the target computer or computer network
was located.
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